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Abstract: This paper concentrates on the role of job matching frictions in in‡uencing the interactions
between fertility choice and wage o¤ers and show that job market frictions are a crucial factor in
wage di¤erentials among female workers. The goals of this paper are to examine how the home-stay
alternative and asymmetric market frictions in‡uence this wage di¤erential and whether the well-
documented negative correlation between fertility choice and female earnings still holds in the face of
life-cycle choices. To address these questions, we develop a search-theoretic model that incorporates
fertility and job decisions and assume that the workers with children face a lower job matching rate
and a higher job quitting rate relative to the rates faced by the workers without children. As a result,
we …nd that a wider wage di¤erential is associated with more asymmetric market frictions and that
the wage di¤erential has a positive e¤ect from output di¤erential, a positive scale e¤ect from the
output of mothers and a negative e¤ect from the utility from staying home. The wage di¤erential is
positively correlated with both fertility and home-stay rates and negatively correlated with market
thickness and matching technology. Furthermore, by having both fertility and home-stay choices
endogenously determined, we can show that a tighter market will enhance the fertility rate and the
home-stay rate and a better job matching technology would not only increase the home-stay rate
but decrease the fertility rate. In general equilibrium, the e¤ects of both market tightness and the
matching technology on the wage di¤erential are indeterminate. These results indicate that the
home-stay choice actually gives workers with children not only an alternative but also the power to
negotiate higher wages. This shrinks the wage di¤erential. Finally, the result that a higher fertility
rate enlarges the wage di¤erential also implies a negative relationship between the fertility rate and
the earnings of workers with children. This result is consistent with standard empirical …ndings.
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1 Introduction
The gender wage gap has received broad attention in economic research. After adopting the policy
on equal opportunities across genders, the gender wage gap has shrunk signi…cantly, but the family
gap has been widened over time. The family gap is referred to the wage gap between non-mothers
and mothers. It is shown in the literature that the family gap explains 40%-50% of the gender gap
[Waldfogel (1998) ]. Therefore, understanding the family gap may help shrinking the gender gap
further.
How large is the family gap? This family penalty counts for 10-15% of mothers’ wage rates,
compared to non-mothers’ wage rates [Korenman Neumark (1992), Waldfogel (1997, 1998a)]. Only
18% of mothers, compared to 45% of non-mothers, earns more than 25% of the earnings for college-
educated men in 1980s, but the family gap between fathers and non-fathers is found insigni…cant
[Goldin (1997)].
This may also explain why female earnings and fertility rate are negatively correlated in the
data [Butz and Ward (1979), Rosenzweig and Schultz (1985), and Mo¢tt (1984)].
There are several explanations on the family gap. One explanation is fertility choice. Theo-
retically, Becker (1985) shows that the responsibility of spending time and e¤orts on child-rearing
usually falls on mothers. This may crowd out mothers’ other activities, which also require time
and e¤orts, such as job searching and career development. Empirically,
Another explanation is women’s labour force participation rate, which is shown signi…cant on
women’s earnings. The labor force participation rate of single women is showb always higher than
that of married women [Goldin (1990), and Van Der Klaauw (1996)]. Moreover, the full-time
earnings of non-mothers is subsequently higher than that of mothers, who broke their employment
at child-birth, in the data of Britain [Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel(1999), and Waldfogel (1995)], and
of Anglo-American, Continental European, Nordic countries [Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel (2007)],
and United States1. The mothers, who maintain employed at childbirth, earn as well as non-mothers
[Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel (1999)].
1The average wage rate of a single female worker is approximately 20% higher than that of a married female worker
[Van Der Klaauw (1996)].
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The individual’s time constraint indicates that childrearing may crowd out other activities that
also require massive time and e¤orts. Many women might leave the labor force for child-rearing
under some circumstances temporarily or permanently or they might optimally choose jobs with a
higher quitting rate. This explanation is borne out by empirical studies which show that women
frequently leave the labor force for pregnancy.
In this paper, our analysis focuses on how much the market frictions can a¤ect the family gap
how market frictions, fertility choice, and women’s labour force participation a¤ect the family
gap, and how the family gap may a¤ect the fertility choice and women’s labour force participation
rate.
This paper aims to look insight the relationships of market frictions, fertility choice, women’s
labour force participation and family gap, the wage gap between mothers and non-mothers, espe-
cially on how they a¤ect each other when market frictions and fertility decisions are endogenously
determined.
For women who hold positions, child-rearing crowds out their career development. This is
especially true for women on the professional jobs that require massive amount of time and e¤orts at
work, such as research scholars, computer programmers, medical doctors, lawyers..etc. Therefore,
if these employed women want to develop career, they may need to either postpone the child birth
or choose being childless. This could be one of the reasons behind the …nding that despite the rapid
growth in the women labour force participation rate since the end of World War II 2, the fertility
rate has been falling in the developed world. Or if these employed women want to bear children,
they may need to postpone the career development, either by switching to the positions or jobs that
require less time and e¤orts at work, or by giving up working, focusing on child-rearing and maybe
returning to the labour force after a signi…cant period of time. This may explain the U-shaped
married women’s labor force participation rate3 [Goldin (1990), Mo¢t (1984), and Addison and
Portugal (1992)].
2Goldin (1990) shows that the labor force participation rate of women grows from 18.9% to 51.1% in the period of
1890-1980.
3That is, married women show the lowest interest to join the labor force at the middle stage of marriage, meaning
4-6 years after getting married.
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The opportunity costs also exist on women who don’t hold positions and have a new-born baby,
especially for those who were engaged in job searching activities before the babies were born. child-
rearing may take mothers’ time away from their planned job searching activities. This may reduce
the likelihood for mothers to …nd a job. Or for mothers who quit their jobs for child-rearing, the
interruption on career development may reduce the likelihood for them to …nd a job. In a tight
job market for workers, these mothers may quit searching for vacancies, leave the labour force, and
stay at home for child-rearing. So the asymmetric market frictions, namely, the job matching and
quitting rates, for mothers and non-mothers, and are important in explaining the fertility choice,
the labour force participation, and the family gap.
Moreover, the labour force participation matters to a mother’s earnings subsequently. On an
individual level, a woman’s earnings indicate her opportunity cost of leaving the labour force to
raise a child. This opportunity costs of rearing a child are increasing in women’s earnings. On the
aggregate level, breaking the employment or postponing career development (switch to jobs that
require less time and e¤orts) may stop or decrease a mother’s earnings. It is found that mothers are
paid lower wage rates than non-mothers, and that full-time earnings of non-mothers is subsequently
higher than that of mothers who broke their employment at child-birth in the data of Britain [Joshi,
Paci and Waldfogel(1999), and Waldfogel (1995)], and of Anglo-American, Continental European,
and Nordic countries [Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel (2007)]. Similar results are also found in United
States4. This may also explain why female earnings and fertility rate are negatively correlated in
the data [Butz and Ward (1979), Rosenzweig and Schultz (1985), and Mo¢tt (1984)]. Butz and
Ward (1979) also point out that the baby bust in the 1960s might have resulted from the increase
in the earnings of female workers. In contrast, that Therefore, the labour force participation is
important for a mother’s earnings, and is crucial in explaining the family gap.
While the non-working mothers sacri…ce their earnings for child-rearing, the working mothers
are paying baby-sitting costs, which may include other costs associated with baby-sitting, from their
own earnings. This means that the baby-sitting costs could be crucial for a woman’s decision on
fertility and labour force participation. If a woman’s earnings are not su¢cient to pay baby-sitting
4The average wage rate of a single female worker is approximately 20% higher than that of a married female worker
[Van Der Klaauw (1996)].
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costs additional to other required living expenses, she may decide not to have a child and stay in
the labour force. If having a child, she may leave the labour force for child-rearing to save the
baby-sitting costs. Therefore, the child-rearing costs may play a role on a mother’s reservation
wage rate.
All observations mentioned above show that it is not child-rearing activities alone that causes
the family gap. Women do have choices on fertility and on labour force participation partially
if not fully. The crucial factors, including market frictions, productivity, home-stay alternative,
opportunity costs for mothers and non-mothers, are important for women’s decisions on fertility and
labour force participation, and are important in determining the family gap. It is important not to
neglect the e¤ects of these factors on each other, which might narrow or widen the family gap. The
e¤ects of these factors on women’s decisions and family gap may not be unidirectional. The goal of
this paper is to …nd how these factors a¤ect each other, then a¤ect women’s decisions on fertility and
labour force participation, and hence, the family gap. In particular, the questions we would like to
address in this paper are as follows. First, how do the asymmetric market frictions a¤ect women’s
decisions on fertility and on labour force participation? How much can the asymmetric market
frictions faced by mothers and non-mothers explain the family gap and fertility rate? Second, how
does that home-stay alternative a¤ect women’s decisions on fertility and labour force participations,
and the family gap? Third, by allowing for endogenous market frictions and home-stay alternative,
will the family gap be enlarged, and will the negative correlation between wage rates and fertility
rate still be captured and remain as strong as the case with exogenous market frictions and home-
stay alternative? How does the family gap a¤ect the market frictions, women’s decisions on fertility
and labour force participation?
A few papers are related to these issues in di¤erent aspects. Galor and Weil (1996) link
the capital stock with the fertility rate and capture the gender wage gap by assuming that child-
rearing places higher demands on women’s time, and conclude that the causation underlying the
negative relationship between fertility and female earnings need not be unidirectional5. In the
existing theoretical analysis related to fertility rate analysis, the home stay alternative of mothers
5Galor and Weil (1996) argue that an increase in the capital-labor ratio will increase the real wage of women and
this will cause a decline in fertility, which in turn enhances capital accumulation and raises women’s wage rates.
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are usually ignored due to the full-employment assumption. However, this home-stay alternative
could be attractive for mothers and causes them to leave the labour force. The search equilibrium
framework constructed by Moen (1997) allows for market frictions and show that the social optimal
equilibrium allocation can be achieved under certain circumstances. Taking one of these literatures
alone is not su¢cient in answering the proposed questions.
To shed light on these questions, we introduce the home-stay alternative into a search-equilibrium
based framework with endogenous fertility and home-staying choices. The focus of the model is on
the interactions between female workers and …rms in a labor market. Each woman decides whether
to bear a child in the future at the beginning of her life; however, whether to conceive depends
on an exogenous probability. The non-mothers would join the labour force while the mothers will
decide whether to stay in the labour force. The mothers who stay in the labour force will conduct
job-relating activities and child-rearing. The job-relating activity is working for employed mothers,
and it is job-searching for unemployed mothers. If deciding to leave the labour force, the mothers
would stay at home and focus on child-rearing. The case in which mothers who chose to stay home
for child-rearing can return to the labor force later, and those who chose to do both child-rearing
and working can leave the labour force will be discussed. The asymmetric market frictions are
assumed in the general case where mothers face a lower job matching rate and a higher job quitting
rate relative to non-mothers.
Consequently, we …nd that in the absence of labor-market frictions, the family gap between
mothers and non-mothers is exactly the output gap of mothers and non-mothers. In the pres-
ence of market frictions, the causalities between fertility rate and women’s job contact rate and
between mother’s transition rate of leaving labour force and women’s job contact rate need not be
unidirectional. Moreover, the more asymmetric market frictions for mothers and non-mothers are,
the wider the family gap will be. The family gap is positively correlated with the output gap of
mothers and non-mothers, and with the degree of asymmetric market frictions between mothers and
non-mothers. The more asymmetric the market frictions for mothers and non-mothers, whether
the job contact rates or the job separation rates, the wider the family gap. However, the overall
e¤ects of this the degree of asymmetric market frictions on fertility rate is ambiguous. While a
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more symmetric job contact rate between mothers and non-mothers may stimulate women’s labour
force participation and reduce the unemployment duration, a more symmetric job separation rate
would discourage the labour force participation and lengthen the unemployment duration. The
policies, such as bene…ts to home-stay mothers, or subsidies to baby-sitting and day-care costs, are
shown e¤ective in stimulating fertility rate and labour force participation, in shrinking the family
gap, and in reducing the unemployment duration.
The ‡ow of the paper is as follows. The environment of the general case is described in section 2,
followed by the speci…cation on matching and bargaining technology in section 3. The equilibrium
is derived in section 4, and the discussion on di¤erent cases is in section 5 and conclusion in section
6.
2 The Environment
The focus of this paper is to analyze how women’s decisions on fertility and labour force partici-
pation, and market frictions a¤ect each other, and hence, the wage di¤erential between mothers’
and non-mothers’, the so called family gap. The market frictions in this paper is referred to the
job matching rate and quitting rate. We incorporate an additional "home-staying" state of women
in the search theoretical framework. Without losing generality, we assume that women make the
fertility decision prior to joining the labour force. However, whether to have children would depend
on both their fertility decision and the probability of conception, which is exogenously determined.
This setup allows us to determine the population of women in di¤erent states, the fertility rate,
the family gap, the labour force participation rate, the unemployment rate, and the unemployment
duration of women.
The economy is populated with a continuum of available workers  , and a continuum of vacan-
cies,  . Total population of women is normalized to one. A woman starts making her decisions at
the time of her own birth, when she decides whether to be fertile. It is assumed that non-mothers
always join the labour force, while mothers have an option of staying at home for child-rearing.
The unemployed mothers who choose to join the labour force would face a lower job matching rate
than the unemployed non-mothers since both child-rearing and job searching activities are time-
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consuming. Moreover, the mothers who choose to stay at home for child-rearing for a signi…cant
period of time may face lower likelihood in …nding jobs when returning to the labour force than
non-mothers, due to the interruption in learning-by-doing, especially in the professional positions,
which require more updated knowledge over time. The employed mothers might face a higher job
quitting rate than employed non-mothers due to the child-rearing activities. For example, the sick-
ness of children and the di¢culty of …nding suitable baby sitters or caretakers for a long period of
time may cause a mother to quit the job. Therefore, in general, mothers face a lower job matching
rate and a higher job quitting rate than non-mothers. This face is also assumed in the model.
The number of vacancies is determined by the market tightness (), which is de…ned as the ratio
of unemployed workers to vacancies. This market tightness indicates the existence of an implicit
entry barrier for …rms. In particular, a greater entry barrier for …rms indicates less vacancies,
and hence, a tighter market for workers ( a higher ) 6. The vacancies are assumed non-worker
speci…c. This means that any vacancy can be …lled by a mother or a non-mother. More details of
the environment are described in the following subsections.
2.1 Populations of subgroups and states
In this model, we do take into account the population growth rate and death rate. The tasks of
this subsection are to describe di¤erent states of women in this model, to specify the probabilities
and arrival rates that divide women into di¤erent subgroups and to determine the populations of
women in di¤erent states. Figure 1 shows the e¤ects of women’s fertile decisions on the population
of the next generation, and Figure 2 depicts the changes of populations of each subgroup and the
‡ows of workers in various subgroups.
As shown in Figure 1, women’s make their fertility decisions at the beginning of their lifetime.
With probability , a woman chooses to be fertile, and with probability (1 ¡ ), a woman chooses
not to be fertile. This fertile decision , which will be endogenously determined later, would divide
6One way to endogenously determine the market tightness is to set the equalization entry condition in which the
‡ow value of an available vacancy is equal to the entry cost in equilibrium [Laing, Palivos and Wang (1995)]. However,
it is hard to analyze the e¤ect of the market tightness in fertility and labor force participation rates in this paper.
Thus, we adopt the environment with the market tightness exogenously chosen.
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women into two groups:  (non-mothers decide not to fertile) and  (not-yet-mothers decide
to fertile). Note that the fertile decision does not make a woman become a mother. It is assumed
that women who choose not to be fertile will not have a child and remain at  group. A woman,
who chooses to be fertile, would depend on an exogenous probability of conception , to become a
mother. It is  that divides the group  further into two subgroups:  (non-mothers, who
decide to be fertile, fail to conceive) with probability (1 ¡ ), and 1 (mothers, who decide to be
fertile, do conceive) with probability . This re‡ects the fact that despite the advanced technology
such as the stem cell research and the assistance by laboratory experiments, the of-conception is
still not completely controlled by human beings.
Let  denote the population of all women, and let  ( =  ,  , and 1) denote the population
of women of a subgroup .
 +  + 1 =  (1)
Note that in each generation, only those of conception would bring the next generation. By
assuming the average number of baby girls of each woman who gives birth is , the population of
the next generation of women is  . Then the new population will decide whether to fertile
at the time of birth, denoted by , which divides the new generation into two streams,  and
 .
As shown in Figure 2, the women in  would conceive with probability  and become the
members of 1. Since  is the only source of 1, given the average death rate , the changes of
1 over time is:
_1 =  ¡ 1 (2)
The in‡ow to  from the new generation is  ., and the in‡ow to  from the new
generation is (1 ¡ ) . So the changes of population in the states  and  are:
_ = (1 ¡ ) ¡  (3)
_ =  ¡  ¡   (4)
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The boundary condition is set as the initial population of the whole economy is normalized to one:
 (0) = (0) +  (0) + 1(0) = 1 (5)
By combining equations (2)-(5), the initial population of each subgroups can be solved as functions
of the endogenous variable  [details in appendix]:
 (0) =
+ 
©
´  () (6)
(0) =
(1 ¡ )
©
´  () (7)
1(0) =

©
´ 1() (8)
, where  ´  ¡ ¡  and © ´ + +  [(1 ¡ ) + 1]. Both  and 1 are increasing in 
while  is decreasing in . Moreover, the steady state population requires out‡ow and in‡ow
to be equal:
 =   (9)
By plugging in equations (5) and (6) into (9), the steady state average number of children starting
at the initial period is a function of :
(0+) = () =
©
(+ )
 (10)
where (0+) is decreasing in . That is, the more women choose to be fertile, the less children each
woman will have in a steady state level.
2.2 Workers
2.2.1 Mothers
Each woman is assume unemployed when entering the labour force. Moreover, an employment may
not be guaranteed by staying in the labour force. Therefore, some women may leave the labour
force. Comparing mothers and non-mothers, it is usually mothers who are more likely to leave the
labour force and stay home for child-rearing. To highlight this fact, we gave this "stay-home" choice
9
() to mothers only. Thus, a mother (1) may be in either of the these three states: unemployed
(1), employed (1), and home-staying ().
1() =  + 1 +1 (11)
As shown in Figure 3, there are in‡ows and out‡ows among these three states. With the job
contact rate  (  1), an unemployment mother 1 will match up with a vacancy and becomes
employed (1), and with the job divorce rate , an employed mother may be separated from her
job and become unemployed (1). With the transition rate , an unemployed mother may leave
the labour force and stay at home for child-rearing (). Note that for an employed mother (1)
to change her state to stay at home for child-rearing, she would be divorced from her job …rst, and
then transit from 1 to . With an arrival rate 7, a home-staying mother would return to the
labor force, and start her job searching (1). In steady state, the following two equations must be
satis…ed:
 = 1 (12)
1 = 1 (13)
By combining equations (8), and (11)-(13), the populations of mothers in di¤erent states can be
solved:
1(; ) =

 +  + 
³
©
´
(14)
(; ) =

 +  + 
³
©
´
(15)
1(; ) =

 +  + 
³
©
´
 (16)
The advantages of being a stay-home mother include not to be restricted by the o¢ce hours,
the deadlines of job applications and interview schedules, and to have more ‡exible schedule for
7 In this framework, we can either have  or  endogenously determined, but not both. Each has its own signi…cance
in interpreting the transition of female labour force and female labour force participation. In the baseline model,
we have  as an endohenous variable. The case in which  is endogenously determined will be discussed in a later
section of the paper.
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personal activities. Let  denote the utility from the advantages of staying home and let 1 denote
an employed mother’s wage rate, which will be determined by Nash bargaining process with equal
division. Let ( = 1 1) denote the value of a woman at state . The ‡ow values of each
state are:
 = + (1 ¡ ) (17)
1 = (1 ¡ 1) + ( ¡ 1) (18)
1 = 1 + (1 ¡ 1) (19)
In equation (17), a mother in the state  receives the utility  from staying at home and may
return to the labor force and change the state to 1 with the arrival rate  . Similarly, the ‡ow
value of a mother in the state 1 is the expected value of changing states: one is to get employed
and change to 1 with the job contact rate , and another is to leave the labour force and change
to  with the transition rate  [equation (18)]. A mother in the state 1 receives the wage rate
1 and could be separated from the job and change to 1 with probability  [equation (19)].
2.2.2 Non-mothers
Both subgroups,  and  , are non-mothers (0), who are assumed always staying in the labor
force without the "stay-home" option. This is the main di¤erence between mothers and non-
mothers. Therefore, there are only two states for non-mothers: employed (0), and unemployed
(0). The total population of non-mothers are:
0() =  () +  () = 0 +0 (20)
Comparing to unemployed mothers, unemployed non-mothers may be able to spend more time on
job searching. Therefore, the likelihood of a unemployed non-mother to get employed is larger
than that of an unemployed mother. Let  denote the job contact rate for an unemployed non-
mother (0) to match with a vacancy and to get employed (0). Let  (  1) denote the job
separation rate for an employed non-mother (0) to be separated from her current job and becomes
unemployed (0). In steady state, the in‡ows equal out‡ows for each state:
0 = 0 (21)
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Combining equations (6)-(7) and (20)-(21) gives the populations of 0 and 0:
0(; ) =

 + 
³
1 ¡ 
©
´
 (22)
0(; ) =

 + 
³
1 ¡ 
©
´
 (23)
The wage rate received by an employed non-mother is 0, which is also determined by Nash
bargaining process with equal division. The ‡ow value of non-mothers in the states of 0 and 0
are:
0 = (0 ¡ 1) (24)
0 = 0 + (0 ¡ 0) (25)
Equation (24) shows that an unemployed non-mother in the state 0 may get employed and change
to state 0 with the job contact rate . An employed non-mother in the state 0 would receive
the wage rate 0 but could be separated from her job and change to state 0 with probability 
[equation (25)].
2.3 Vacancies
The vacancies are assumed to be non worker-speci…c and it is indivisible. That is, a vacancy can be
…lled by either a mother or a non-mother. This gives a vacancy three states: empty ( ), …lled by a
mother (1), and …lled by a non-mother (0). In general, the child-rearing activities may distract
mothers from their work. To shed light on this fact, it is assumed that the average productivity of a
mother (1) is di¤erent from that of a non-mother (0)8. Both 0 and 1 are public information and
exogenously determined. Since the mass of vacancies may be di¤erent from the mass of unemployed
female workers, the job contact rate of a vacancy to an unemployed worker () may be di¤erent
from the job contact rate of an unemployed worker to a vacancy ( and ). That is, a vacancy
would be …lled with the exogenous probability . Let ¦( = 1 0) denote the ‡ow value of a
8Another interpretion behind this assumption is that the average hourly productivities of mothers and non-mothers
are the same, but mothers need to reserve some time for child-rearing activities, and tend to pick up part-time positions.
Thus, the total monthly or annual productivity of a mother is lower than that of a non-mother.
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vacancy in the state .
¦1 = (1 ¡ 1) + (¦ ¡ ¦1) (26)
¦0 = (0 ¡ 0) + (¦ ¡ ¦0) (27)
¦ = 
£
1
¡
¦1 ¡ ¦ ¢ + 0 ¡¦0 ¡ ¦ ¢¤ (28)
, where 1 ´ 1 , 0 ´ 0 ,  = 0 + 1 and 1 + 0 = 1. As shown in equations (26) and (27),
the ‡ow value of of a vacancy …lled by a female worker is the sum of the net pro…t created by
that particular female worker and the expected value of changing states when the employed worker
leaves this position. The ‡ow value of an empty vacancy (¦ ) [equation (28)] is the expected value
of this vacancy to be …lled by either an unemployed mother or an unemployed non-mother. By
plugging equations (26) - (27) into equation (28), we get:
¦ (; ) =
 [1 (+ ) (1 ¡1) + 0 ( + ) (0 ¡0)]
 f( + ) ( + ) +  ( + 1 + 0)g
 (29)
Then ¦0(; ) and ¦1(; ) can be obtained by substituting equation (29) into equations
(26) and (27).
2.4 Matching and Bargaining Technology
In this search-theoretical framework, unemployed workers and vacancies are the two parties search-
ing for each other to …nd a match. It is assumed that one position …ts only one worker, and vice
versa. Thus, the ‡ow match of unemployed workers must equal to the ‡ow match of vacancies.
It is assumed that this match process is based on a random matching function, 0( ), which
exhibits constant return to scale:
0 + 1 =  = 0( ) (30)
where 0 represents a matching technology. For example, the web site creation (e.g. JOE) may
drive up the matching rate between unemployed workers and vacancies, which would be re‡ected
in a higher 0.[Diamond (1982a, 1982b, and 1984), and Laing, Palivos, and Wang (1995)].
Once does a vacancy and an unemployed worker meet, they would determine the wage rate
based on a simple symmetric cooperative Nash bargaining rule with equal division of the surplus.
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This means that the wage rates will be determined at a level where the joint surplus of the vacancy
and the worker will be maximized [equations (31) and (32)]:
max
1
[¦1 ¡ ¦ ]12[1 ¡ 1]12 (31)
max
0
[¦0 ¡ ¦ ]12[0 ¡ 0]12 (32)
The optimization of equations (31) and (32) gives:
1 ¡ 1 = ¦1 ¡ ¦ (33)
0 ¡ 0 = ¦0 ¡ ¦ (34)
, which determines 1 and 0, respectively. The equilibrium wage rates ¤0 = 0(; ) and
¤1 = 1(; ) can then be pinned down by the following two equations, respectively:·
1
 + + 
+
 +  + 1

¸
¤0 ¡
1

¤1 =
( +  + 1) 0 ¡ 11

(35)
¡0

¤0 +
·
 +  + 

+
 +  + 0

¸
¤1 =
¡00 + ( +  + 0) 1

+


(36)
, where  ´  ( + ) + ( + ) ( +  + ),  ´ ( + ) ( + ) +  [1 ( + ) + 0 ( + )].
3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the values of , , and  can be solved endogenously. Then all populations and
equilibrium wage rates, which can be derived as functions of , , and , can all be determined.
While  can be solved by matching function [equation (30)], both  and  will be solved by the
no-arbitrage conditions.
By plugging equations (14) and (22) into equation (30), we can rewrite  as:
 (; ) =


·

 + 
³
1 ¡ 
©
´
+

 +  + 
³
©
´¸
 (37)
Let  ´  denote the market tightness. An increase in  indicates an increasing di¢culty for
unemployed workers to match with a vacancy. Equations (30) and (37) can be written as:
 = (; ) =
0(; ) + 1(; )
 (; )
(38)
 = 0( 1) (39)
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where equation (38) has the character   0. Both equations (38) and (39) can be plotted on
a ( ) space and to determine ¤ = ( ) [Figure 5].
3.1 No-arbitrage Conditions
The no-arbitrage conditions are to re‡ect the situations faced by women when they make decisions.
The conditions states that a woman feels indi¤erent in the choices she has when making decisions.
In other words, the ‡ow values of each option is the same. Equation (41) shows the no-arbitrage
condition of a woman when making fertility decision, while equation (40) is the condition of a
mother when making labour force participation decision. Note that when making her labour force
participation decision, a mother would have to consider the baby-sitting and day-care costs, denoted
by , which are not counted in the ‡ow values of joining the labour force
¡
1
¢
. That is because
even before becoming employed, a mother may need to pay for baby-sitting or day-care costs to
attend job interviews or job training lessons. These baby-sitting and day-care costs are not avoided
for a mother staying in the labour force.
 = 1 ¡  (40)
 =   (41)
By substituting ¤ in equations (40) and (41), we could use Cremer’s Rule to solve both  and 
[details in appendix]. This case where , , and  are endogenously determined, is called general
case. The results of this general case are included in the next section. In order to evaluate how
the crucial endogenous variables a¤ect the equilibrium, we now turn our attention to discuss cases
in which either one or all are exogenous.
4 Case Studies
In this section, the focus will be on the family gap, women’s labour force participation rate, unem-
ployment rate in equilibrium in three cases. These three cases are when both market tightness 
and the transition rate  are exogenous (case I), when  is exogenous and  is endogenous (case II),
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and when both  and  are endogenous (case III,.general case). Then through the comparison of
three cases, we could analyze the e¤ects of  and  on fertility rate  and ¦ , then on the family
gap, women’s labour force participation rate, and unemployment rate. The family gap is the wage
gap of mothers and non-mothers, de…ned as  ´ 0 ¡ 1. In this model, only mothers in the
state  do not join the labour force, so the women’s labour force participation rate is  ´ 1¡ .
Unemployment rate, de…ned as  ´ ¡  is the ratio of women in the labour force but not yet
employed.
There have been several policies proposed to stimulate fertility rate in developed countries. One
of the policies wildly adopted is child bene…ts. In this model, this policy has to be discussed in two
di¤erent aspects. One aspect is to improve the utility of staying home for mothers (an increase in
), and another aspect is to subsidize baby sitting costs (an increase in ). The e¤ects of these
two variables will be our focus in each case. More of other possible policies will be analyzed in the
general case (case III).
4.1 Case I: exogenous market tightness() and transition rate()
According to equation (30), both  and  can be written as ¤ () and ¤ (). After combining the
equations (26)-(28), and (33)-(34), the values of  0 and 1 can be determined. Furthermore,
both 0 and 1 react to ¦ negatively , and 0 reacts to ¦ more strongly than 1 does [see
equations (A17) and (A18) in appendix]. Then equations (A17), (A18), and (41) jointly provide
the equilibrium equations (A19), called ¦( ) locus, and (A20), called ¦ () locus, to
determine both ¦ and 9. As shown in Figure 6, while ¦ () locus is independent of ,
¦ ( ) locus is decreasing in .
The family gap  and unemployment rate  are both increasing in  and  is de-
creasing in . That could be caused by the positive e¤ect of  on . When a vacancy
¡
¦
¢
becomes more valuable (an increase in ¦ ), women would respond by reducing the fertility rate ()
to compete on matching with that vacancy. Therefore,  increases,  decreases, and 
shrinks.
9Note that  endogenously determines  ( = 0 1), which appears on equation (A19), the ¦
 ( ) locus.
¦ () is independent of .
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If there is an increase in the utility of home staying , would move both ¦( ) and ¦ ()
downward. Thus,  would increase in response to an increase in  since the e¤ects of  via ¦ ()
locus tend to dominate. This means that an increase in home-staying utility for mothers would
encourage the fertility rate (). This will in turn, enlarge the family gap, decrease women’s labour
force participation rate, and increase women’s unemployment rate.
However, the change of baby sitting and day care costs  has no e¤ects in this case. Therefore,
when the market tightness and the transition rate are exogenous, improving home-stay mothers’
utility (an increase in ) is more e¤ective in stimulating the fertility rate () than subsidizing baby
sitting and day care costs.
4.2 Case II: exogenous market tightness(), and endogenous transition rate()
In this case, the transition rate () of mothers to leave the labour force is endogenous determined.
To do so, equation (40) is introduced, and together with equations (A19)-(A21), the equilibrium
values of ¦   and  can be determined.
An increase in the utility of home staying  would lead more mothers to leave the labour force,
and cause  and  to increase, but ¦ to decrease. Note that an increase in  would reduce ¦ as
case one and enlarge the family gap. Additionally, an increase in  caused by a higher , on one
hand, would reduce
¡
¦
¢
further and widen the family gap (). On the other hand, an increase
in  drives up mother’s wage rate (1) by increasing mothers’ reservation wage. This would shrink
the family gap (). If the e¤ect of  via  dominate that via ¦ , the family gap in case two is
smaller than that in case one,    .
Note that the decrease in ¦ increases both 0 and 1, and an increase in  would drive up 1
further. This pecuniary advantage for all women, mothers and non-mothers, would attract women
to join the labour force and to demotivate them to have children (a decrease in ). However, the
increase in  would stimulate more women to bear children (an increase in ). When the negative
e¤ect of  on ¦ is su¢ciently small, the overall e¤ect of an increase in  would drive up fertility
rate (). Therefore, this increase in both  and  caused by a higher  would reduce . The
 in case two would be lower than that in case one,    . However, the increase in
 and  a¤ect  in opposite directions and the positive e¤ects of  on  is stronger than
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the negative e¤ects of  on . Therefore, the overall e¤ect of  on  is positive, and 
in case two is lower than that in case one,    
A subsidy on baby-sitting and day care costs for mothers (a decrease in ) would increase ¦ 
and . This, in turn, would shrink , increase , and decrease  due to the stronger
e¤ects of  via  on  than via . Therefore, in this case, both improving the utility of home-
stay mothers (an increase in ) and subsidizing in baby-sitting and day care costs () would both
be e¤ective in enlarging the family gap.
4.3 Case III (general case): endogenous market tightness() and transition
rate()
The case in which both market tightness () and transition rate of leaving the labour force () are
endogenously determined is discussed. Equation (37) is introduced to pin down the value of .
Equation (37) can be written as  =  (), where  is increasing in . Together with equations
(A19)-(A21), we can now solve the equilibrium values of , , ¦ and  and determine the e¤ects
of the important factors, such as the values of staying home (), the baby-sitting and day care costs
(), and the degree of symmetry on the job frictions of mothers and non-mothers ( ), on the
equilibrium values, and hence on the family gap (), women’s labour force participation rate
(), and the unemployment rate of women ().
According to equation (A22), in this general case, an increase in  would drive up both  and
, then a¤ect  indirectly via  and . While a higher  increases  and , a higher  decreases
 and . In turn, the decrease in  would reduce  but would would push up  to a higher level,
and hence, increases  and  to higher values. Therefore, an increase in  would stimulate . This
increase in  would increase , ¦ , but would decrease .
An increase in  caused by an increase in  would drive up all women’s wage rates, both 0 and
1, and widen the family gap () since the impacts of  on 0 is stronger than on 1. However,
the strong negative direct e¤ects of  on  together with the indirect negative e¤ects of  on 
via ¦ , an increase in  would shrink  overall. Meanwhile,  would increase, and 
would decrease if the direct e¤ect of  on  dominate.
This case has shown that the causalities between fertility rate () and women’s job contact rate
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() and between mother’s transition rate of leaving labour force () and women’s job contact rate
() need not be unidirectional. The women’s contact rate () a¤ects , , and  directly
and indirectly via , , and ¦ . Moreover, some of the indirect e¤ects might o¤set the direct e¤ects
of  on  and . More interestingly, if direct e¤ects dominate, the overall e¤ects of
 on  and  in case III become opposite to those in case II. It would require the indirect
e¤ects of  on  and on  via  then  to be su¢ciently strong to dominate the direct
e¤ects, in order for the overall e¤ects of  on  and  consistent with case I and II. Then
the comparison on three cases would give    , and      .
Moreover, the endogenously determined market tightness  in this job matching model also
allows us to discuss the duration of unemployment for women. The unemployment duration is
de…ned as: (  ) ´  and has the following characteristics:   0,   0,   0
[see the appendix]. That means that an increase in job contact rate () would reduce the market
tightness () and make it easier for an unemployed worker to match with a vacancy; hence, the
unemployment duration will be reduced. In response to an increase in , the unemployment
duration ( ) would be lengthen.
The e¤ects of a subsidy in  on , , and , then on , ,  and  are similar to
that of an increase in . It is worth to note that the change in  has only indirect e¤ects via both
¦ and  on , and both indirect e¤ects a¤ect  in the same direction. The change in , however,
has direct e¤ects on , but its indirect e¤ects via ¦ and  are opposite. Therefore, it is unclear
whether it is an increase in  or a decrease in  that would have stronger e¤ects on the equilibrium
values, and hence on , ,  and 
Additional to the e¤ects of  and , the variables that cause the asymmetry of mothers and
non-mothers are worth discussion. They are  and . An increase in  indicates an increase in the
job separation rate for non-mothers, and an increase in  means that mothers are facing an increase
in the job contact rate. At  = 1, mothers and non-mothers face the same job separation rates,
and at  = 1, mothers and non-mothers face the same job contact rates. Both An increase in 
and a decrease in  a¤ect , ¦ and , and hence, , ,  and  in the same direction. To
be more speci…c, an increase in  decreases  and ¦ . Although it has direct positive e¤ects on ,
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both of its indirect e¤ects on  via  and ¦ are in the opposite direction. This leaves the overall
e¤ects of an increase in  on  ambiguous, while the dominant direct e¤ects of  would result in an
increase in , and a decrease in , , and  . Meanwhile, both  and  a¤ect  negatively
and directly, and this direct e¤ects of  and  on  tend to dominate the indirect e¤ects.
Above all, we can conclude that the policies towards to symmetric job frictions for mothers
and non-mothers, either on the job contact rate ( = 1) or on the job separation rate ( = 1)
would shrink the family gap but leave the overall e¤ects on fertility rate ambiguous. Meanwhile,
while the policies that increase  would stimulate women’s , and reduce the  and  , the
policies increase  would do the opposites on ,  and  . The policies that target on
bene…tting mothers, such as subsidies on baby sitting and day care costs or on home-stay mothers,
may stimulate the fertility rate, but might widen the family gap as well.
5 Conclusion and Extensions
The features of the search theoretical framework allows us to look insights the links of family gap,
fertility rate, labour force participation rate, unemployment rate and duration, and market frictions
and to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of various policies on shrinking the family gap and stimulating
the fertility rate. We …nd that the policies towards to symmetric job frictions for mothers and
non-mothers may shrink the family gap, but may not stimulate the fertility rate. Moreover, while
an increase in mothers’ job contact rate might increase women’s labour force participation rate,
and reduce the unemployment rate and unemployment duration, an increase on non-mothers’ job
separation rate would do the opposites to the labour force participation rate, unemployment rate and
unemployment duration. The policies, that encourage mothers to stay-home, and subsidize baby
sitting and day care costs, may be e¤ective in both stimulating fertility rate and women’s labour
force participation rate, shrinking the family gap, and reducing the unemployment duration.
There are several possible extension from this model. The …rst possible extension is to intro-
duce heterogeneity of vacancies and workers, and allow for segmented job markets. To be more
speci…c, vacancies could target on either mothers or non-mothers. Mothers and non-mothers could
have di¤erent preferences over positions. The second extension is to allow for multi-matching on
20
vacancies and workers. This extension could address the issues on part-time and full-time positions.
It is possible for a worker to work for several part-time positions, as well as for one position …lled in
with several part-time workers taking turns to work. The third extension is to allow for more states
and to allow women to change between di¤erent states. For example, this model has restrictions in
evaluating the e¤ectiveness of maternity leave on the family gap and fertility rate. All these pos-
sible extensions might provide insights of the links between job markets, women’s decision making
on fertility and labour force participation. The understanding on these links would be helpful for
policy makers who are interested in stimulating the fertility rate, and shrinking the family gap, and
hence, possibly the gender gap, at the mean time.
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Appendix
Steady state population ‡ow:
Solving the di¤erential equations, the general solution for  can be written as:
 () =  (0)(¡¡) (A1)
=  (0)
where  ´  ¡ ¡  Similarly, one can write:
1() = 1(0) (A2)
 () = (0) (A3)
Equation (2) can now be written as:
1()

= 1(0) =  ¡ 1 (A4)
Therefore, once can solve
1(0) =
 (0)
+ 
(A5)
Following the same steps, we …nd
(0) =
 (1 ¡ ) (0)
+ 
(A6)
Combining with equation (5), and letting © ´  +  +  [ (1 ¡ ) + 1], the population of all
subgroups can be found.
 (0) =
+ 
©
´  () (A7)
1(0) =

©
´ 1 () (A8)
(0) =
 (1 ¡ )
©
´  ()  (A9)
The value of F: Solved from population
From Figure 2, the ‡ows of the population should be equal for each status, and based on market
clearing condition, 2 ‡ow population equations are su¢cient. Thus, the ‡ow population equations
for statuses  and  are chosen:
() :  = (1 ¡ ) (A10)
() :  = (1 ¡ ) (A11)
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Plus the equation of total population normalization:  + + = 1Then all population can be
solved:
 =
1
1 +
(1¡)
 +
(1¡)

; =
(1 ¡ )

; =
(1 ¡ )

(A12)
Section 4:
Given the population of  and  and the Poisson arrival rates from  to ,  , and from
 to , , the following equation can be obtained:  = (1 ¡ )Thus,  = ( + ).
Given the calculation details in the previous sections, the wage rates of workers with and without
children when the exchangeability is allowed are given by:
() =  ¡ f() +  +  + (1 ¡ )]g[( +  + )
 ¡ ] + (1 ¡ )
¢()
(A13)
() =  ¡ [( +  + )() +]
 + (1 ¡ ) [(+  + ) ¡ ]
¢()
(A14)
where  ´  +  + ,  ´  +  + (1 ¡ ),  ´ ( + )( +  + ) + ( + ), () ´
( + ) + (1 ¡ )( + ), ¢() ´ ( +  + )f() + [+  + (1 ¡ )]g +[ + ]
No-arbitrage conditions: By substituting ¤ ¤1( ) 
¤
0( ) into equations (40) and (41), we
get:
 (+ ) = ¤¤1( ) ¡ ( +  + ¤) [( + )+ ] (A15)
 ( + ) [ ( + ¤ + ) (+ ) ¡ (1 + )¤0( )] (A16)
= (1 + )¤ ( + ) ( +  + ¤)¤0( )
¡ ( + ¤ + ) [¤ (+ )¤1( ) +  ( + ) ( +  + ¤)] 
Section 5
Case I: exogenous  and 
Combining equations (35), (36) and (41) to determine the values of 0, and 1. We …rst
derive 0 and 1 as functions of ¦ :
0(¦ ) =
( + + )
¡
0 ¡ ¦
¢
+ 2(+ )
(A17)
1(¦ ) =

¡
1 ¡ ¦
¢
+  ( + )
+ ( +  + ) ( + )
 (A18)
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which shows that ¦  0 ( = 0 1), and
¯¯
0¦
¯¯

¯¯
1¦
¯¯
.
Then plugging both equations (A17) and (A18) into equations (29) and (41) gives the following
equilibrium conditions to determine ¦ and .8<:1 ¡ 
8<:
(+)
+(++)(+)
+0
h
(+)(++)
+2(+) ¡ (+)+(++)(+)
i
9=;
9=;¦ (A19)
=
 ( + ) ( + )

½
(+  + ) 1 ¡ 
+ ( +  + ) ( + )
+ 0
·
0
+ 2( + )
¡ ( +  + ) 1 ¡ 
+ ( +  + ) ( + )
¸¾
·
(1 + )
+ 2 ( + )
¡  ( + )
+ ( +  + ) ( + )
¸
¦ (A20)
=
(1 + )0
+ 2( + )
¡ 

½
+ ( + ) +  ( + )
·
1 + ( + )
+ ( +  + ) ( + )
¸¾

Case II: exogenous  and endogenous 
Rearranging both equations (40) and (A20) gives:
¦ =
 [1 + ( + )] ¡ f( + )+ ( +  + ) [+ ( + )]g

(A21)
=
(1+)0
 ¡ 
n
+ ( + )+  ( + )
h
1+(+)

io
h
(1+)
 ¡ (+ )
i
where  ´  + ( +  + ) ( + ), and  ´  + 2 ( + ). Equation (A21) helps pin down
equilibrium values of ¤ and
¡
¦
¢¤ , which can be substituted into equation (A19) to determine
equilibrium value of ¤. In turn, both equilibrium values of ¤0 and 
¤
1 can be determined.
Case III: endogenous  and 
By combining equations (37) to (39), we can re-write  as follows:
 ´ 

=
µ


¶ 24 ©+ + [(1¡)¡2](+)(++)
©
+ +
f[(1¡)¡(1¡)]¡2g
(+)(++)
35 =  () (A22)
where  is increasing in , and equilibrium  can be determined by equations (38) and (39), as
shown in Figure 5. It is through the job contact rate  that the factors a¤ect  and

Unemployment duration  (  ) ´  , and by applying equation (A22), the unemployment
duration can be written as:
 (  ) ´ 

=
µ
1

¶24 ©+ + [(1¡)¡2](+)(++ )
©
+ +
f[(1¡)¡(1¡)]¡2g
(+)(++ )
35
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where  has the following characteristics:   0   0   0
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